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The Constitutionality of Utah's 
Hazardous Waste Disposal Fee 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The interstate shipment of hazardous wastes has become a 
matter of increasing national concern. Each year the United 
States produces over 275 million tons of garbage, making the 
nation the largest per capita producer of waste on the planet.1 
The crush for landfill space is ever increasing, particularly in 
the densely populated Northeast. 2 In the search for additional 
space and lower costs, waste producers are willing to ship their 
garbage hundreds of miles for disposal. Ohio alone imports over 
7,000 tons of solid waste daily from the Eastern seaboard 
where landfill charges are much higher. 3 A typical Long Island 
landfill charges $125 per ton to dump municipal waste. In con-
trast, a typical Indiana landfill charges $12 per ton. With 
transportation costs at only $33 to $35 per ton from New York 
to Indiana, it is clear that shipping is a cost effective mea-
sure.4 
Recycling technology is lagging far behind the country's 
ability to make trash, and people understandably have the Not 
In My Back Yard (NIMBY) syndrome.5 Legislators in various 
states have heard the cries of their constituents and in recent 
years have enacted statutes which prohibit, limit, or tax the 
importation of hazardous and solid wastes from other states.6 
Industry, in turn, contends that the interstate shipment of 
waste is necessary for its survival. Many companies claim that 
1. Debora MacKenzie, If You Can't Treat It, Ship It, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr 1. 
1989, at 24. 
2. Robert Meltz, State Discrimination Against Imported Solid Wastes: Constitu-
tional Roadblocks, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10383 (1990). 
3. Anthony J. Celebrezze Jr., Ohio Proposes Solutions for Its Solid Waste 
Problems, 18 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2303 (1988). 
4. See Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F: Supp. 
739, 748 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
5. ·Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v. Bayh, 734 F. Supp. 
853, 855-56 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
6. The states include Alabama, California, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Utah and others. 
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states have failed to establish adequate sites for waste treat-
ment, while other corporations assert they have developed 
centralized waste sites for their factories, which require waste 
shipments across state boundaries.7 
Utah has not been immune from all the furor. In June of 
1991, Utah officials took a militant stand against out-of-state 
shipments of hazardous waste when the "Cancer Cannonball" 
raced from South Carolina to Utah.8 Utah legislators have also 
imposed a hazardous waste disposal fee which is more than 
two times higher for out-of-state generators.9 This legislation 
has constitutional implications. 
The courts have not allowed states to discriminate against 
interstate commerce on the theory of a political union. The 
increase in legislation regulating the transportation of hazard-
ous and solid waste has led to a corresponding rise in litigation 
challenging these laws. 
This comment will examine the problem of the interstate 
shipment of hazardous wastes by focusing on the constitution-
ality of Utah's hazardous waste disposal fee. Next, it will look 
at the hazardous waste regulatory scheme and national case 
law on disparate hazardous waste fees as violations of the 
Commerce Clause. Finally, this comment will explore current 
Utah bills and pending national legislation which could com-
pletely change the present trend. 
II. THE HAzARDOUS WASTE REGULATORY SCHEME 
In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) to regulate the generation, 
transportation, and disposal of solid waste. 10 One of Congress' 
main objectives was to establish a viable Federal-State partner-
ship to carry out the purposes of RCRA. 11 In order to facilitate 
the partnership, Congress authorized state or regional solid 
waste plans to be developed by the individual states.12 Recent-
ly, Utah joined the ranks of states which have and manage 
7. Waste Shipment Bans Seen Danger to Chemicals; Hazardous Waste Trans-
portation Policy, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Vol. 239 No. 19, May 13, 1991, at 3. 
8. Margaret E. Kriz, The Big Stink, NAT'L J., Vol. 23 No. 42, Oct 19, 1991, at 
2540. 
9. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-118 (1991). 
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 to 6992(k) (1991). 
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(7) (1991). 
12. See 42 U.S.C §§ 6941 to 6949(a) (1991). 
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their own form of the RCRA scheme. 13 
In development of its plan, the Utah legislature included a 
fee on the disposal of both hazardous and nonhazardous solid 
wastes. The nonhazardous solid waste management fee is a flat 
rate imposed upon all owners or operators of disposal or incin-
erator sites. 14 The hazardous waste disposal fee falls upon the 
generators of hazardous waste. In-state generators pay a fee of 
$8 dollars per ton while out-of-state generators pay $20 dollars 
per ton. 15 This statute apparently violates the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
Ill. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The Commerce Clause states that "[t]he Congress shall 
have Power ... [3.] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."16 
This clause gives Congress plenary power to regulate interstate 
commerce. 
When examining Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme 
Court will immediately strike down any state statute that di-
rectly violates a federal statute. 17 When the state statute does 
not conflict directly with existing federal legislation, the Court 
interprets the statute in accordance with the dormant Com-
merce Clause. The Court has developed several tests to deter-
mine whether a state statute is constitutional. The Court eval-
uates a statute differently depending on whether it is facially 
neutral or facially discriminatory. There is also a defense for 
the state if it is acting as a market participant. 
13. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6 (Supp. 1991). 
14. See UTAH CODE -ANN. § 19-6-119 (Supp. 1991). 
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-118 (Supp. 1991). 
(l)(a) An owner or operator of any commercial hazardous waste disposal 
or treatment facility that primarily receives wastes generated by off-site 
sources not owned, controlled, or operated by the facility or site owner or 
operator, and that is subject to the requirements of Section 19-6-108, 
shall collect from the generator: 
(i) a fee of $8 per ton, or fraction thereof, on all hazardous waste 
generated in this state that is received at the facility or site for 
disposal or treatment; and 
(ii) a fee of $20 per ton, or fraction thereof, on all hazardous waste 
generated outside of this state that is received at the facility for 
disposal or treatment. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
17. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). 
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A. The Quarantine Cases and Wastes as Objects of Commerce 
The United States Supreme Court first entered the battle 
over interstate movement of solid wastes in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey. 18 This case is the touchstone for all subse-
quent decisions on the topic of transboundary movement of 
hazardous and solid wastes. New Jersey captured two dissent-
ing votes by analogizing the movement of hazardous wastes to 
the movement of quarantined items. 19 
According to a line of quarantine cases, states can ban the 
importation of items "which, on account of their existing condi-
tion, would bring in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, 
[which], from their condition and quality, [are] unfit for human 
use or consumption."20 These quarantine laws are not consid-
ered forbidden protectionist measures even though the state 
statutes discriminate against interstate commerce. 21 The City 
of Philadelphia Court recognized that individual states have 
the authority to prohibit noxious articles from entering the 
state even though this prohibition discriminates against inter-
state commerce. 
Writing for the majority in City of Philadelphia, Justice 
Stewart distinguished prior cases by saying that "quarantine 
laws banned the importation of articles such as diseased live-
stock that required destruction as soon as possible because 
their very movement risked contagion and other evils. Those 
laws thus did not discriminate against interstate commerce as 
such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever 
their origin."22 By summarily removing the quarantine de-
fense, the Court held that solid waste was an article of com-
merce, not a noxious item since the harm does not arise until it 
is placed in the landfill. Once in the landfill, out-of-state gar-
bage is the same as in-state garbage.23 
The Supreme Court's holding in City of Philadelphia has 
nullified the "quarantine" defense for statutes which ban the 
movement of solid waste into a particular state. The Supreme 
18. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
19. See ld. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Burger). 
20. Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888). 
21. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935); Sligh v. 
K'rkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 254 (1908); 
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878). 
22. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29. 
23. ld. at 629. 
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Court has declared that solid waste is an object of commerce 
that should be treated like any other article which travels in 
interstate traffic.24 
The holding in City of Philadelphia left open the question 
of whether hazardous wastes could be considered noxious. Haz-
ardous wastes are a subcategory of solid wastes that are in-
nately more dangerous than other solid wastes. The question of 
whether hazardous wastes should be common articles of com-
merce comes down to whether their use in interstate commerce 
outweighs the dangers of transporting them. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit answered this question by proclaiming that hazardous 
wastes are an object of commerce subject to the Commerce 
Clause. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Philadelphia in reaching 
its decision.25 
A federal district court in Chemical Waste Management, 
Inc. v. Templet,26 bolstered thSupreme Court's stance by stat-
ing that the federal government has developed a comprehensive 
scheme (RCRA) for regulating hazardous waste which can, and 
does, provide for its safe transportation. Since the dangers of 
moving hazardous waste does not outweigh the benefits, courts 
have found that hazardous waste, as well as solid waste, is an 
object of commerce. 
B. Statutes Which Are Facially Discriminatory 
Courts first analyze whether the statute is neutral or dis-
criminatory on its face. If the court finds the legislation dis-
criminatory on its face, there is a virtual per se rule of invalidi-
ty.27 However, if the state has a legitimate local concern for 
enacting the statute, the court may not strike it down.28 
The inquiry, therefore, is whether the statute is a protec-
tionist measure or is legitimately directed at local concerns 
with only incidental effects on interstate commerce.29 The Su-
24. ld. at 622. 
25. See National Solid Wastes ManagementAss'n v. Alabama Dep't ofEnvl. Manage-
ment, 910 F.2d 713, 719 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991). 
26. 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La. 1991). 
27. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. 
DuMond, 336 U.S. 524, 537-38 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 
(1948). 
28. See Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 320 (1852). 
29. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; National Solid Waste Management 
Ass'n. v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244, 259-60 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
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preme Court test is fundamentally one of strict scrutiny. If the 
state does not have a compelling reason for placing a burden on 
interstate commerce, the statute is struck down as unconstitu-
tional no matter how slight the burden on commerce.30 Laws, 
such as the new Utah law, must have a compelling reason for 
placing the burden of a higher fee on interstate commerce. 
National Solid Waste Management Association v. 
Voinovich,31 provides an excellent illustration of this analysis. 
In National Solid Waste, a corporation challenged an Ohio 
statute on Commerce Clause grounds. The statute imposed a 
fee on the disposal of wastes within the state of Ohio. This fee 
was $0.70 for wastes generated within the management district 
and $1.20 for waste generated outside the management district. 
For out-of-state generated garbage the fee was set at $1.70.32 
Furthermore, other fees and charges could be added by the 
various districts on their own accord. 33 
The court determined that fees of 42 to 300% higher for 
out-of-state generators were discriminatory and asked the state 
to show a legitimate local concern that would provide a compel-
ling reason for placing a burden on interstate commerce. The 
state offered three reasons for the need to tax out-of-state 
wastes at a higher rate. First, Ohio claimed that the increasing 
amount of waste flowing into the state was a sufficient reason 
in and of itself. Second, Ohio claimed that there were addition-
al regulatory problems when the wastes came from out-of-state. 
There was no way to inspect them at the point of origin, and 
determining their composition at the point of disposal was 
more costly. Third, the state argued that the increased threat 
of hazardous materials coming into the state justified taxation 
by placing higher fees on the foreign waste. 34 
The court quickly dispatched the first and third reasons by 
saying that there was no evidence or reason for treating out-of-
state wastes diffe.rently.35 As to the second reason, the court 
said that the state could impose a higher fee for inspection, but 
concluded that the purpose of the statute was more for raising 
30. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. 
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising 
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). 
31. 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
32. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.57(a) (Anderson 1991). 
33. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.57(b) (Anderson 1991). 
34. National Solid Waste, 763 F. Supp. at 262. 
35. ld. 
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revenue than to clean up the state's landfills.36 Still, the court 
asserted that even if the higher fee was to inspect, there was 
no evidence to show that it cost more to examine garbage arriv-
ing from outside the state. 37 The court found the statute un-
constitutional as a "transparent attempt to discourage the 
shipment of solid wastes into Ohio."38 
Although the Ohio law placed a fee upon solid wastes, a 
court's analysis would be very similar when applied to the 
Utah fee on hazardous wastes. The state of Utah may always 
assert that the health of its citizens is paramount. This may be 
a compelling reason for placing a burden on interstate com-
merce. However, Ohio was not able to meet the test of strict 
scrutiny. 
Utah's law will also hit the same snag as Ohio's statute. 
The statute states that the fees will be used to carry out haz-
ardous waste monitoring and response programs.39 It will be 
extremely difficult for Utah to show that the costs of monitor-
ing out-of-state wastes is more expensive than monitoring in-
state wastes when the garbage is sitting in the same storage or 
disposal site. 
In Government Suppliers Consolidating Service, Inc. v. 
Bayh,40 the constitutionality of an Indiana solid waste statute 
was also subject to strict scrutiny. The Indiana legislation 
called for a fee of $0.50 for every ton of Indiana waste deposit-
ed in an Indiana landfill. The fee for waste generated outside 
the state of Indiana was equal to the fee for dumping the trash 
at a site closest to the location where the trash was generated, 
less the fee charged by the Indiana landfill for dumping gar-
bage there.41 In other words, it would cost out-of-state gener-
ators the same amount to dump in Indiana as it would to dump 
the waste at the nearest landfill, except transportation costs 
would be higher to ship to the more distant Indiana disposal 
site. · 
The court found the statute discriminatory on its face and 
applied an elevated version of the strict scrutiny test. In Gov-
ernment Suppliers, the court said that the "state bears the 
36. ld. at 264. 
37. ld. 
38. ld. at 265. 
39. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-llS(l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1991). 
40. 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
41. See IND. CODE § 13-9.5-5-1 (Supp. 1991). 
286 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
burden of justifying the discrimination by showing the follow-
ing: "(1) the statute has a legitimate local purpose; (2) the stat-
ute serves this interest; and (3) nondiscriminatory alternatives, 
adequate to preserve the legitimate local purpose, are not avail-
able."42 This is an elevated version of the traditional test of 
strict scrutiny that places the responsibility of proving the 
existence of a compelling reason upon the state. 
The court held that there was a legitimate local purpose 
but also pointed out that this purpose can not be a "post hoc" 
rationalization. The governor claimed that the health and wel-
fare of Indiana's citizens necessitated the statute. The court did 
not argue with the claim but struck down the statute on the 
third part of the test. The court stated that many reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives were available to the Indiana legis-
lature. 43 These included charging a flat fee to slow the flow of 
all wastes into the state's landfills44 or tying the amount of 
the tipping fee to the state's costs rather than to the hauler's 
costs.45 
The court struck the Indiana statue down for basically the 
same reasons that the National Solid Waste court did in Ohio. 
The state failed to assert any difference between Indiana waste 
and imported waste that would justify the discriminatory treat-
ment. Due to the fact that reasonable nondiscriminatory alter-
natives existed, the court declared that the statute violated the 
Commerce Clause. 
Utah's law possesses the same flaws as the Indiana stat-
ute. The in-state fees differ from out-of-state fees, and there is 
no reasonable justification for the different amounts. Utah, like 
Indiana, may claim that health and welfare are the reasons 
supporting the legislation, but reasonable nondiscriminatory 
alternatives to the fee will always exist. Thus, Utah's law likely 
is unconstitutional under the Government Suppliers test as 
well. · 
In a footnote, the court in Government Suppliers discussed 
42. Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 763; (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979), Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 
432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977), Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 
(1951), for the original tests). 
43. Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 770. 
44. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). 
45. See AI Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Cffishen, 556 F. Supp. 231, 238-39 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) affd mem., 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982). 
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the fact that the statute may be found neutral on its face. 46 
While this seems incredible, the court stated that the Indiana 
law had the possibility of only charging a fee of $0.50 on out-of-
state generators as well, though this would clearly be only a 
hypothetical place.47 If a court were to somehow find Utah's 
law facially neutral, the court would apply a different type of 
test. 
C. Facially Neutral Statutes 
If a court were to find that the Utah law dealt with in-
state and out-of-state generators evenly, the court would apply 
the balancing test found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 48 The 
test is used "[ w ]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental."49 The statue would 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on commerce is excessive 
in relation to the local benefits. 
In order to apply this test to the Utah law, a court would 
be forced to balance safety and welfare against the economic 
effects of the legislation. This is close to impossible, as there is 
no effective method of arriving at a legitimate figure for either 
category. However, the court in Government Suppliers believed 
that the test was the same whether the statute was neutral or 
not since there was a legitimate state interest.50 The court in 
National Solid Waste may have thought along similar lines 
when it stated that there should be a balancing test where 
there is a compelling reason for the different fees. 51 
When a court begins balancing local versus national inter-
ests, the national interests are bound to prevail. However, it is 
a balancing test. A court may go either way on the issue, but 
the weight of the limited authority available clearly points 
towards unconstitutionality. 
D. The Market Participant Defense 
Up to this point in the analysis, the Utah law seems fatally 
flawed. However, the state of Utah has a defense. If Utah is 
46. Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 766-67 n.34. 
47. Id. 
48. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
49. ld. 
50. Government Suppliers, 753 F. Supp. at 767. 
51. 763 F. Supp. 244, 260 (1991). 
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able to show that it is acting as a market participant rather 
than a market regulator, the statute will be allowed to stand. 
The question of whether a landfill operated by the state could 
fall within the market participant doctrine was expressly re-
served by the Supreme Court in City of Philadelphia. 52 
The theory behind the exception is that the state, when 
acting directly in the marketplace, is analogous to a private 
business. The test is simply whether the state is acting in the 
marketplace or if it is regulating the market.53 The defense is 
limited in that the state can regulate no further "downstream" 
than it is acting as a participant.54 
The Third Circuit found that a landfill charging different 
fees was a market participant in Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. 
Lycoming County.55 In Swin, the county charged one rate for 
waste generated locally and a rate which was three times high-
er for waste generated outside of a five and a half county area. 
The county operated the landfill and, therefore, was entitled to 
act as any other landfill operator. Since a private landfill oper-
ator may raise her rates for generators outside a given area, 
the county was permitted to do the same.56 
This would mean that Utah could raise its rates, or charge 
fees for all waste coming from out-of-state, if the storage or 
disposal site was owned and operated by the state. However, 
all private landfill and incinerator operators would not be sub-
ject to the fees. A court analyzing the situation would probably 
hold that the statute is unconstitutional because it affects both 
private and public disposal sites. If Utah were to alter the law 
to affect only the state, county or city owned dumps which 
accepted hazardous waste, the statute could be allowed to 
stand. 
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In the past year on both a national and state level, legisla-
tors have introduced bills which would significantly change the 
current law on the matter of hazardous waste disposal fees. 
52. 437 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1978). 
53. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 
208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980); Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). 
54. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). 
55. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). 
56. !d. at 250. 
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These bills are working their way through Congress and the 
Utah State Legislature. Utah is examining various changes to 
Utah Code Section 19-6-118 (1990), while Congress seeks to 
amend the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 
A. Proposed Changes to Utah Code Section 19-6-118 
Early in January 1992, bills were introduced into both the 
House and the Senate of the Utah Legislature. Both bills aimed 
to change the hazardous waste disposal fee provision currently 
in Utah law. However, the two bills varied radically in their 
approach. 
The first bill was introduced to the Utah Senate on Janu-
ary 13, 1992 by Senator Stephen J. Rees.57 The bill was de-
signed to amend several of Utah's hazardous and solid waste 
statutes, among which, the hazardous waste disposal fee is 
included. During the last days of the 1992 session, Senator 
Rees' bill was passed into law. 58 
The changes in the law will be significant. The new law 
will expand the number of disposal sites that will be required 
to collect the fee for the state. The law will include sites that 
burn hazardous wastes in the fee scheme along with formerly 
covered waste disposal or treatment facilities. 59Addi tionally, 
the new law will change the fee scale. Mter July 1, 1992, haz-
ardous waste generated within the state will be charged a fee 
of $10 per ton or fraction of a ton. This fee will raise $2 each 
July 1st for the next two years, making the fee $14 per ton af-
ter July 1, 1994.60 Also on July 1, 1992, out-of-state wastes 
would be subject to a fee of $25 per ton or fraction thereof. The 
out-of-state fee will also escalate by $5 each July resulting in a 
fee of $35 per ton after July 1, 1994.61 
This bill faces the same constitutional questions that face 
the current Utah Jaw. The tariff on the disposal of hazardous 
wastes places a greater burden on wastes generated outside of 
Utah. This is an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
57. S. 25, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 Utah S.B. 25. 
58. Jerry Spangler and Lois Collins, Utah could become cleaner and safer due 
to environmental bills, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 27-28, 1992, at A4. 
59. S. 25, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT S.B. 25 § 19-6-118(1)(a) and (b), as 
amended on the Senate floor. 
60. S. 25, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT S.B. 25 § 19-6-ll8(2)(a), as amended 
on the Senate floor. 
61. S. 25, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT S.B. 25 § 19-6-ll8(2)(b), as amended 
on the Senate floor. 
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merce. 
The second bill was introduced to the Utah House just 
three days after Senate Bill 25 was advanced. 62 Mr. H. Craig 
Moody's House Bill 165 also sought to change the existing dis-
posal fee by imposing an escalating scale on the discarding of 
hazardous waste.63 However, this bill's approach is far differ-
ent than Senate Bill 25, which was eventually passed by the 
legislature. Examination of the house bill's approach is still 
pertinent, as it may be the approach Utah takes in the future if 
the existing Utah law is found unconstitutional. 
House Bill 165 sought to base the fee on the amount of 
waste disposed of rather than on where the waste was generat-
ed. The first hundred tons of waste thrown away would be 
charged a fee of $8 per ton.64 For disposal of hazardous waste 
in excess of 100 tons, but less than 300 tons, a fee of $50 per 
ton or fraction of a ton would be charged. 65 For each ton of 
hazardous waste in excess of 300 tons, the fee would be a 
whopping $80 per ton.66 The bill limits the fee for dumping 
hazardous waste to $8 per ton for Utah sites that are listed as 
EPA Superfund sites as of December 17, 1991, regardless of the 
tonnage dumped. 67 
The fees which would be charged by this bill are astronom-
ical, but constitutional. House Bill 165 wanted to remove the 
disparate fee for waste generated out of the state of Utah. This 
would have removed all of the constitutional questions from 
Utah Code Section 19-6-118. 
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 
1991 
On April25, 1991 United States Senators Baucus, Chafee, 
and Burdick introduced a bill entitled the Resource Conserva-
tion & Recovery Act Amendments of 1991.68 Hearings on the 
62. Utah Bill Tracking, 1992 UT H.B. 165. 
63. H.R. 165, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT H.B. 165 § 19-6-118. 
64. H.R. 165, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT H.B. 165 § 19-6-118(1)(a)(i), as 
amended and substituted by the Committee on Health and Environment. 
65. H.R. 165, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT H.B. 165 § 19-6-118(1)(a)(ii), as 
amended and substituted by the Committee on Health and Environment. 
66. H.R. 165, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT H.B. 165 § 19-6-l18(1)(a)(iii), as 
amended and substituted by the Committee on Health and Environment. 
67. H.R. 165, 49th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1992 UT H.B. 165 § 19-6-118(1)(b), as 
amended and substituted by the Committee on Health and Environment. 
68. S. 976, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
279] UTAH'S HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL FEE 291 
bill have been held by the Senate Subcommittee on Environ-
mental Protection for several months, and a vote on the bill is 
expected soon.69 This bill, if enacted into law, will change the 
methods of waste disposal in this country overnight. 
The entire bill would make several changes and alterations 
to the current version of RCRA, including a new section to 
Subtitle D. 70 This new section would give authority to the 
states to impose restrictions on interstate wastes and to charge 
separate fees for the disposal of in-state and out-of-state waste. 
The bill gives states authority to impose fees on interstate 
wastes, effective upon the enactment of the RCRA Amend-
ments of 1991.71 Importing states may impose and collect fees 
for out-of-state municipal solid waste on an escalating scale. 72 
These fees start at two times the state's base in-state fee or $4, 
whichever is greater, for wastes generated in contiguous states. 
This rises to five times the state's base in-state fee or $10, 
again whichever is greater, for wastes generated in non-contig-
uous states. The bill defines "contiguous states" as states which 
share a common land border. 73 Since Utah's base in-state fee 
is only $8, Utah would be able to charge five times $10 on 
waste coming from California or any other non-contiguous 
state. This amounts to a $50 per ton fee, which is more than 
double Utah's currently enacted fee. 
This scale imposed by the bill escalates, and after thirty-
six months, importing states may raise their fees again. Contig-
uous states pay a fee which is four times the greater of the 
base fee or $10, while noncontiguous states pay ten times the 
base fee or $50.74 If this bill passes, California municipal 
waste could face a fee of $500 per ton just to dump in Utah by 
1994. This is in addition to transportation and dumping or 
incineration costs. Additionally, Utah has the authority to raise 
its in-state fee. This would mean that the fee could be even 
higher. 
Additional escalation is both possible and probable. Each 
year after 1990 the fees listed above will increase by the Con-
sumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI).75 The bill 
69. 1991 S. 976 Bill Tracking Report. 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 
70. The proposed statute would be designated as RCRA § 4013. 
71. S. 976, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 4013(2) (1991). 
72. ld. § 4013(3). 
73. ld. § 4013(3)(D). 
74. ld. § 4013(3)(B). 
75. ld. § 4013(3)(C). 
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allows this adjustment to be made if the increase keeps the 
CPI above the 1990 levels. 76 In other words, the fee can only 
go up, never down. 
The bill provides an incentive for states to become an au-
thorized state under RCRA.77 A state may not impose the 
higher fees set forth above unless it is an authorized state. 
Also, after the initial thirty-six month period, a state is given 
authority to restrict or even impose a complete ban on waste 
generated in another state provided that the state has an ap-
proved plan under section 4013 and the exporting state does 
not have an approved plan. 
The bill also promotes recycling. Fees may not be charged 
for waste that is moving in interstate commerce to be recy-
cled. 78 Congress leaves the determination of the types of prac-
tices which will be considered recycling to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and gives the EPA six months to pro-
pose regulations along those lines. 
If Congress passes Senate bill 976, Utah's law will meet no 
resistance, as its constitutional status will no longer be in 
doubt. The Utah legislature will have authority given by the 
United States Congress to impose disparate fees on municipal 
solid waste, of which hazardous waste is a subcategory. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional validity of Utah's hazardous waste dis-
posal fee is doubtful. A court which applies the Commerce 
Clause tests which have been set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court will find Utah's law unconstitutional. Utah's 
law is discriminatory on its face, and a version of strict scru-
tiny would be applied. Because there are less discriminatory 
and nondiscriminatory alternatives available, Utah's law would 
be struck down. . 
The market participant defense is inapplicable to Utah's 
law. The Utah law is applied to both private and public hazard-
ous waste landfills and incinerators; therefore, the defense does 
not apply. However, if public landfills choose to apply the high-
er fee for wastes generated out-of-state, it should be allowed 
76. ld. 
77. An "authorized" state runs a program similar to the RCRA scheme on a 
state level. The EPA only oversees the operation, and is not actively involved. See 
42 u.s.c. § 6943 (1991). 
78. S. 976, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 4013(4)(D) (1991). 
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under the market participant doctrine. 
The new law passed by the Utah Legislature still leaves 
the question of constitutionality in the air. Senate Bill 25, the 
new law, will perpetuate the unequal fees and leave the statute 
in a perilous position. On the other hand, House Bill165 would 
have completely removed the disparate fees from the statute 
and replaced them with a system that considered the amount 
of waste generated rather than the origin of the waste. This 
would have encouraged generators to lower the amount of 
waste produced rather than shop for the lowest costs. 
The RCRA Amendments of 1991 provide Utah with the 
hope of keeping the hazardous waste disposal fee on discrimi-
natory grounds. If this bill, or a substantially similar one is 
passed by Congress, Utah's law will be vested with Congressio-
nal authority. RCRA's 1991 amendments will have given the 
several states the power to legally discriminate against inter-
state commerce. 
Troy Fitzgerald 
